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Proprietary Remedies in Insolvency: A
Comparison of the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment with English
and Commonwealth Law
Anthony Duggan*
Abstract
This Article deals with proprietary remedies, in particular the
constructive trust, and their application in the defendant’s bankruptcy. The
Article offers a comparative analysis of English and Commonwealth law
with the relevant parts of the recently completed Restatement (Third) of
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment. The discussion is organized around five
simple hypotheticals, each representing issues which courts in England and
other parts of the Commonwealth have found particularly troubling:
mistaken payments; misrepresentation in the context of land dealings;
misrepresentation in other contexts; breach of fiduciary obligation; and
specific performance. The aim is to identify the likely outcome in each case
under both American and English/Commonwealth law and to explore the
policy implications of the differences that emerge.
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I. Introduction
At its Annual Meeting in May 2010, the American Law Institute (ALI)
approved the Restatement of the Law (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
Enrichment in its final form. The vote marked the end of a project that had
run for more than ten years and that involved the progressive release and
revision of seven tentative draft documents under the direction of Reporter,
Professor Andrew Kull. The Restatement covers every aspect of the law of
restitution, drawing together a wide range of doctrines and principles and
exploring the inter-face between restitution and other parts of private law,
including contract, tort, property, and the law of fiduciary obligations. To
borrow ALI Director Lance Liebman’s words, we can see in the
Restatement "a structure that holds together—as if this were natural and not
manmade—an extraordinary variety of legal disputes and legal doctrines."1
The Restatement traverses a host of "[fascinating] legal controversies" and
it sends an important message about "the continued vitality of the common
law as a vehicle for applying contemporary values to provocative
disputes."2
The Restatement also serves an important educational function because,
as Kull himself has remarked, "[s]carcely anyone in the United
1. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008).
2. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).

OF

RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT

OF

RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT

PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN INSOLVENCY

1231

States understands what restitution is about . . . [m]ost law schools gave up
teaching restitution a generation ago, and many judges and practitioners are not
familiar with its general principles."3 This regrettable state of affairs has important
implications for commercial law at large, and bankruptcy law in particular,
because "[l]ack of familiarity with the restitutionary elements of the background
[commercial law] rules results in a predictable distortion of commercial law."4
Liebman predicts that "lawyers, judges and professors will use [the
Restatement]."5 He seems to have a mainly United States audience in mind, but
there is also much lawyers in other common law countries could learn from the
Restatement. It has become common for courts in England, Australia, Canada
and New Zealand to look to one another’s case law for guidance, but reliance on
United States law is much less common. In the same connection, private law
scholarship in Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Canada, is markedly
Anglo-centric in focus, and there is a tendency to overlook the wealth of United
States case law and literature on nearly any given topic. In the area of restitution
and unjust enrichment, this blind spot is especially puzzling, given that the now
global restitution movement originated in the United States with Seavy and
Scott’s ground-breaking work on the first Restatement on restitution.6
One of the many topics the Restatement covers is proprietary remedies
for claims in restitution and their status in the defendant’s insolvency.7 This
was one of the last parts of the project to be completed. It spanned two
tentative drafts—numbers 6 and 7—published on March 12, 2008 and March
12, 2010, respectively. Coincidentally, Richard Calnan, an English lawyer,
happened to be writing a book on the same topic during this very period and
Calnan’s work was published around the time of the ALI’s 2010 Annual
Meeting.8 There is no reference to the Restatement in Calnan’s book and,
likewise, the Restatement makes no reference to Calnan. This may be some
confirmation of the blind spot mentioned above, though to some extent it is
probably also an accident of timing. In any event, the appearance of
Calnan’s book at around the same time the finishing touches were being put
to the Restatement was the inspiration for this Article.
My
3. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 266–67 (1998).
4. Id. at 267.
5. Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008).
6. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 54–61
(2011) [hereinafter, RESTATEMENT] (addressing proprietary, not monetary, remedies).
8. RICHARD CALNAN, PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND INSOLVENCY (2010).
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aim is to compare English and Commonwealth law on proprietary remedies,
drawing substantially on Calnan’s account, with the American position, as
found in the Restatement.
The topic raises one of the most vexing questions in the law of
obligations. It involves the interplay between two fundamental principles
of insolvency law: (1) the pari passu sharing principle, which establishes
that unsecured creditors are entitled to equal treatment in a debtor’s
bankruptcy;9 and (2) what might be called the property of the estate
principle, which holds that the property available for distribution among
creditors is limited to the debtor’s own property at the date of the
bankruptcy and does not include assets belonging to others.10 The
application of these principles, in turn, depends on the distinction between
personal and proprietary rights and the problem is that, in a common law
system, this is not a straightforward exercise because equity blurs the
boundaries. So the positive challenge is to identify the factors which
motivate courts of equity to recognize proprietary claims, while the
normative challenge is to identify those cases in which it is appropriate, as a
policy matter, to give the claimant a proprietary interest.
The following discussion is organized around five simple
hypotheticals, each representing fact patterns which courts in England and
other parts of the Commonwealth have found particularly troubling. My
aim is to identify the likely outcome of each case under both American and
9. See RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. f (discussing U.S. law). Calnan provides the
following description of English law:
The pari passu sharing principle is one of the main tenets of insolvency law, and
has been so for centuries. The expression (which means, literally, ‘in equal
steps’) establishes that, at least as the general rule, all creditors are equal. It is
normally given in its Latin form, and is rarely translated into the vernacular.
Perhaps this is because a reference to ‘equal’ sharing might be misleading. Each
creditor is not entitled to an equal amount. His entitlement is to be paid the
same proportion of his debt as the other creditors. If creditor A is owed 100, and
creditor B is owed 50, equality of treatment will require A to receive twice as
much as B. It is perhaps this ambiguity in the meaning of ‘equality’ which has
led us to retain the use of the Latin tag at a time when it is no longer fashionable
to use them, even amongst lawyers.
CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.10.
10. See RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note b (noting that in U.S. law "claims of
creditors (whether voluntary or involuntary) must be satisfied from property of the debtor,
not from property of someone else in the debtor’s possession"). For English law, see
CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.62 ("[T]he pari passu sharing principle requires the assets of a
debtor to be applied in discharge of his liabilities pari passu. It is a fundamental element of
this principle that it is the debtor’s assets which are to be used for this purpose, not those of
other persons.").
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English-Commonwealth law and to explore the policy implications of
differences that may emerge. The hypotheticals are grouped under five
broad headings: mistake (Part II, below); misrepresentation (1) (Part III);
misrepresentation (2) (Part IV); wrongful gains (Part V); and specific
performance (Part VI). Part VII concludes.
Part VI deserves a further word of explanation. The Restatement does
not discuss specific performance in any detail because, by definition,
specific performance is not a restitutionary remedy. However, specific
performance is conceptually the mirror-image of rescission—in the sense
that specific performance, by completing the contract, delivers to the
claimant the asset he paid for while rescission, in unmaking the contract,
restores to the claimant the value she parted with in the course of
performance.11 Furthermore, the constructive trust remedy is commonly
associated with both rescission claims and claims for specific performance
and the Restatement does deal at length with the constructive trust.12 For
these reasons, any discussion of proprietary remedies in insolvency would
be incomplete without some reference to specific performance even if this
involves straying beyond the limits of the restitution project.
Incidentally, there is a salutary reminder here. The restitution project
is an exercise in what Stephen Waddams has called the "mapping of legal
concepts," namely the schematic classification of private law into discrete
subject areas—contract, tort, property, and so on—by reference to
characteristics which unify some cases and distinguish others.13 Mapping
serves an important organizational function; it assists our understanding of
the law by dividing the overall mass into manageable chunks and, perhaps
more importantly, by making connections that might otherwise have
escaped our attention. But, by the same token, as Waddams points out,
mapping carries a degree of risk because, in any classification scheme,
there is a tendency to treat the divisions as exhaustive and mutually
exclusive.14 In real life, legal problems commonly traverse subject
boundaries and, in such cases, too rigid a classification scheme may be an
11. See RESTATEMENT § 54 cmt. e ("[W]hen rescission affords an alternative remedy
for breach of a valid and enforceable contract . . . [it] permits the injured party to make a
fundamental election, choosing to go backward (to the status quo ante) instead of forward
(by enforcement of the contractual exchange).").
12. See id. § 55 (discussing constructive trusts).
13. STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING (2003), Ch. 1, Introduction: The Mapping of Legal
Exclusion of Others.
14. See id. at 11 (noting the "question of whether it is necessary or desirable to think in
terms of exhaustive and mutually exclusive divisions").
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obstacle to a comprehensive understanding of the issue. To avoid this risk,
we must constantly remind ourselves that the boundaries we draw are not
fixed: that, for example, a contract problem may also engage elements of
tort law,15 or—returning to the subject at hand—that a remedies question
may traverse any given set of legal classifications (restitution, contracts,
property, equity, bankruptcy law, and so on). More specifically, while the
constructive trust may be part of the law of restitution, it is not exclusively
a restitutionary remedy, and it may serve a contract enforcement function as
well.16
II. Mistake
Case 1. Bank A makes a transfer of $1 million to Bank B by mistake.
Bank B goes into bankruptcy before Bank A can recover the money. The
payment is still identifiable in Bank B’s hands. Can Bank A claim a
constructive trust over the funds?
A. The Restatement
Case 1 is based on Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank
(London) Limited.17 Comparable American cases include Simms v. Vick18
and Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach
Employees of America, Division 998 v. Danielson.19 The answer to the
question matters because if Bank A’s claim succeeds, it will recover
payment of the disputed funds in full ahead of Bank B’s other unsecured
15. See id. at 23–34 (showing connections between contract law and tort law).
16. See Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALBERTA L. REV. 173,
175–82 (1999) (discussing breach of duty and constructive trusts); see also RESTATEMENT
§ 55 cmt. i ("In some circumstances, a decree that one party holds property in constructive
trust for another will be similar if not identical in effect to a judgment granting specific
performance of the recipient’s previous promise to the claimant.").
17. See Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank (London) Ltd. [1981] Ch.
105, 128 (holding that the defendant had become a trustee over the mistaken payment made
by plaintiff).
18. See Simms v. Vick, 65 S.E. 621, 621 (N.C. 1909) (holding that a mistaken
payment, unlike a voluntary payment, could be recovered by the plaintiff).
19. See Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am., Div.
998 v. Danielson, 128 N.W. 2d 9, 11-12 (Wis. 1964) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to
restitution of mistaken payment to defendant less payment made by defendant relying on the
honest belief that mistaken payment was hers).
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creditors. If Bank A’s constructive trust claim fails, at best it will have a
personal claim for recovery of the payment which will rank pari passu with
other unsecured claims in Bank B’s bankruptcy.
The governing
Restatement provisions are Sections 6, 55, and 60, which provide, in
relevant part, as follows:
§ 6. Payment Of Money Not Due
Payment by mistake gives the payor a claim in restitution against the
recipient.
§ 55. Constructive Trust
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to
identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation of the
claimant’s rights, the defendant may be declared a constructive trustee,
for the benefit of the claimant, of the property in question and its
traceable product. . . .
§ 60. Priority
(1) Except as otherwise provided by statute and by § 61, a right to
restitution from identifiable property is superior to the competing rights
of a creditor of the recipient who is not a bona fide purchaser or payee
of the property in question. Acquisition of a judicial lien (by
attachment, garnishment, judgment, execution, or the like) does not
make the lien creditor a purchaser of the property subject to lien. . . .20

Section 6 establishes that, on the facts of Case 1, Bank A has a claim in
restitution against Bank B. Section 55 establishes that, provided the
disputed funds are specifically identifiable in Bank B’s hands,21 Bank A is
entitled to constructive trust relief. Section 60 establishes that Bank A’s
constructive trust claim has priority over Bank B’s trustee in bankruptcy,
given that the trustee is not a purchaser for value of the property in
question. The trustee acts as the representative of the general creditors and
so she stands in the same position as they do relative to Bank A’s claim.
The general creditors, in turn, are not purchasers for value because:
(1) with the exception of judicial lien creditors (or execution creditors, as
they are known in England and other parts of the Commonwealth), an
unsecured creditor has no claim to any particular asset belonging to the
debtor; and (2) a judicial lien creditor may have a claim to the disputed

20.
21.

RESTATEMENT §§ 6, 55, 60.
As to which, see infra notes 49–54 (addressing forms of payment).
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asset, but the judicial lien is an involuntary transaction and so the creditor
does not qualify as a purchaser for value.22
Restatement Section 60, Illustration 1, which is analogous to Case 1,
above, confirms this analysis:
Broker’s accounts indicate that Customer has a credit balance of
$25,000 when the true balance is zero. Broker thereafter remits $15,000
at Customer’s request. By the time the mistake comes to light,
Customer is in bankruptcy. Applying the tracing rules of § 59 . . . ,
Broker is able to identify the $15,000 paid by mistake in the closing
balance of Customer’s bank account. Broker asserts a right to recover
the $15,000 via a constructive trust (§§ 6 . . , 55 . . . , 59). Bankruptcy
Trustee opposes Broker’s claim arguing that restitution to Broker would
be unfair to Customer’s general creditors. Because the rights of
Customer’s creditors (or of Trustee as their representative) in the
property of Customer cannot exceed the rights of Customer himself,
Broker is entitled to restitution of $15,000 in priority to the claims of the
general creditors.23

The purpose and effect of the constructive trust remedy in cases like this is
to give the claimant priority over the insolvent defendant’s general
creditors. What justifies this special treatment? According to the
Restatement, the main argument rests on the property of the estate
principle: "claims of creditors (whether voluntary or involuntary) must be
satisfied from property of the debtor, not from property of someone else in
the debtor’s possession."24 In re Berry,25 on which Illustration 1, quoted
above, is based,26 provides support for this proposition:
It is urged that to compel restitution now will work injustice to the
general creditors of the bankrupts, but this contention loses sight of the
fact that the money in dispute never belonged to the bankrupts, and their
creditors, upon broad principles of equity, have no more right to it than
if the transaction of November 25th had never taken place. If the
trustees succeed on this appeal the creditors will receive $1,500, the
equitable title to which was never in the bankrupts. There can be no
doubt of the fact that the payment to Berry & Co. was a mistake and that
by reason of this mistake the trustees have in their possession $1,500
22. See RESTATEMENT §60 cmt. b (discussing judicial lien creditors).
23. RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. c, illus. 1; see also id. illus. 13 (providing an illustration
to similar effect).
24. RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. b.
25. See In re Berry, 147 F. 208, 211 (2d Cir. 1906) (holding that a mistaken payment
to trustees in bankruptcy be returned to the mistaken payor).
26. See RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. b (saying that In re Berry is the basis
for Illustration 1).
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which, otherwise, they would not have. The proposition that Raborg &
Manice, who have done no wrong, shall be deprived of their property
and that it shall be divided among creditors to whom it does not fairly
27
belong, is not one that appeals to the conscience of a court of equity.

The trouble is that this rationalization begs the question by presupposing an
equitable proprietary interest in the claimant. The passage anticipates
Cardozo J.’s famous statement in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,28
which the Restatement cites as the basis of the constructive trust provision
in Section 55:29
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a
trustee.30

But this statement does not advance matters very far because it fails to
specify the circumstances affecting the conscience of the legal title-holder.
In relation specifically to the facts of Case 1, why is it unconscientious for
Bank B’s trustee to retain the beneficial interest in the disputed funds? The
answer cannot be that the funds belong in equity to Bank A, because that is
the very question at issue. So if there is an answer, it must be sought
outside the parameters of Cardozo J.’s statement.
A suggestion commonly advanced in the academic literature is that
Bank A qualifies as an involuntary creditor, in the sense that, because it
made the payment by mistake, it did not voluntarily accept the risk of Bank
B’s insolvency, and this distinguishes its claim sufficiently from the claims
of ordinary unsecured creditors to justify giving it priority.31 Of course,
there are other kinds of involuntary creditors, of which tort claimants are
the most prominent example, who, as the law presently stands, do not enjoy
priority in the defendant’s insolvency, and this prompts a further inquiry
into the distinguishing characteristics of Bank A’s claim relative to other
involuntary creditors. One possible response is that Bank A’s claim rests on
the twin pillars of: (1) its status as an involuntary creditor; and (2) the fact
27. In re Berry, 147 F. at 210, quoted in RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. b.
28. See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 388 (N.Y. 1919) (ruling
that "[t]he equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief").
29. See RESTATEMENT § 55 cmt. a (quoting the passage).
30. Beatty, 122 N.E. at 380.
31. See, e.g., Emily L. Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 297, 298 (noting "three elements of a constructive trust claim that favor the
constructive trust claimant in relation to other creditors").

1238

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229 (2011)

that the disputed funds are specifically identifiable as the product of Bank
B’s unjust enrichment.32 The Restatement appears to endorse this
explanation in the following passage:
Priority in this three-way contest may be explained without reference to
formal notions of title. Even if A’s suit for restitution is formally
asserted against B as recipient, A’s implicit claim—to justify in
equitable terms the remedy of constructive trust—is that B’s voluntary
and unsecured creditor C will be unjustly enriched, at A’s expense, if
B’s debt to C is satisfied from assets that B obtained from A by fraud [or
mistake]. The intuitive objection is that a debtor should not be allowed
to rob Peter to pay Paul.33

The statement is couched in terms of a contest between A and C, but it
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case where A’s dispute is with B’s trustee
in bankruptcy. This version of the argument is subject to the same logical
difficulty as the original argument; it rests partly on the proposition that A is
an involuntary creditor, but to distinguish A from other involuntary
creditors it invokes the robbing Peter to pay Paul metaphor. However, the
validity of this characterization depends on the assumption that A has a
proprietary interest in the first place which is independent of its status as an
involuntary creditor.34
B. English and Commonwealth Law
The leading case on point in England and the Commonwealth is Chase
Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank (London) Ltd.35 It was common
ground in the proceedings that the governing law was the law of the State of
New York, but Goulding J. took New York and English law to be the same,
holding that: "[A] person who pays money to another under a factual

32. See id. (listing special "elements of a constructive trust claim that favor the
constructive trust claimant in relation to other creditors"); see also Kull, supra note 3, at 282
("Property obtained by fraud or mistake, like property obtained by theft, has not come into
possession of the debtor by a voluntary transaction. To distribute it to creditors would
therefore result in an involuntary transfer, accomplished in two stages, from claimant to
creditors.").
33. RESTATEMENT § 55 cmt. d (emphasis added).
34. See generally Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All Involuntary
Creditors Should be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2004).
35. Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel British Bank (London) Ltd., [1981] Ch. 105.
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mistake retains an equitable property in it and the conscience of that other is
subjected to a fiduciary duty in respect of his proprietary right."36
The court relied on both English and American authority in support of
this conclusion, including In re Berry.37 It also quoted with approval
Story’s proposition "that the receiving of money, which consistently with
conscience cannot be retained is, in Equity, sufficient to raise a trust in
favor of the party, for whom, or on whose account, it was received,"38 and
Scott’s statement that "where chattels are conveyed or money is paid by
mistake, so that the person making the conveyance or payment is entitled to
restitution, the transferee or payee holds the chattels or money upon a
constructive trust."39
In the later House of Lords decision, Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council40—which was not itself a
mistaken payment case—Lord Browne-Wilkinson made some observations
in passing about the Chase Manhattan Bank case, pointing out that a
constructive trust could only be awarded if the payee bank’s conscience
was affected which, in turn, would require proof that it was aware of the
mistake.41 He concluded by saying that, "[a]lthough I do not accept the
reasoning of Goulding J., Chase Manhattan may well have been rightly
decided. . . . Although the mere receipt of the moneys, in ignorance of the
mistake, gives rise to no trust, the retention of the moneys after the recipient
bank learned of the mistake may well have given rise to a constructive
trust."42 This qualification is significant because by the time the payee
bank’s conscience is affected by notice of the mistake, "the specific
proceeds of the payment might have ceased to be identifiable among [its]
assets" and "[t]he constructive trust would fail unless the subject-matter
which it was to bind could be identified."43

36. Id. at 119.
37. See id. at 120 (referencing In re Berry).
38. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1255 (2d ed. 1839).
39. 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 465 (4th ed. 1989).
40. See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council,
[1996] A.C. 669, 689 (holding that "there is no basis for holding that a resulting trust arises
in cases where money has been paid under a contract which is ultra vires and therefore void
ab initio").
41. See id. at 714–15 (discussing Chase Manhattan Bank).
42. Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
43. DAVID FOX, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MONEY ¶ 4.152 (2008).
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In summary, English case law remains unsettled: The Chase
Manhattan Bank case was only a first instance decision while Lord
Browne-Wilkinson’s statement in the Westdeutsche case amounts at best to
qualified support for the earlier decision and it substantially limits its
application. Among the more recent first instance cases, which go both
ways,44 Papamichael v. National Westminster Bank (No. 2)45 is noteworthy
for the following statement:
Regardless of what they might actually do in practice, I fancy that most
people who had been paid too much change would regard the excess as
belonging to the mistaken payer. Similarly, where a bank accidentally
credits an account with money not due to the account holder, (mild
schadenfreude apart) most people would regard the credit as being that
of the bank . . . [I]t is obvious that someone who pays money by
mistake stands on a different footing from a supplier who knowingly
takes the risk of non-payment and often obtains security against that
danger. Perhaps more to the point, once one allows of the fact that
assets may be subject to a constructive trust where acquired in breach of
a fiduciary relationship, I cannot see a distinction in principle that would
preclude a trust arising where they have been acquired in consequence
of a mistake.46

If this view were to prevail, English law would stand on much the
same footing as the Restatement’s account of the American position.
However, the English case law—such as it is—has not been free from
criticism and at this point it cannot safely be predicted what direction it
might eventually take. Calnan argues that the Chase Manhattan Bank case
was wrongly decided, as a matter of both law and policy, and that in
disputes like Case 1, Bank A should have only a personal claim for recovery
of its payment.47 In the first place, he points out that there are two types of
case:
(1) where A’s mistake is induced by B, for example by
misrepresentation, duress or undue influence; and (2) cases—like the Chase
Manhattan Bank case—where A’s mistake was self-induced.48 In a Type
44. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.161 ("The recent first instance cases do little to
resolve the issue. Some judges are reluctant to impose a constructive trust where there has
been a mistake, and feel more comfortable relying on recission [sic] where that is
available . . . . But other judges take a more expansive view.").
45. See Papamichael v. Nat’l Westminster Bank (No. 2), [2003] EWHC (Comm) 164
[225] (noting that "a solvent recipient, just as much as an insolvent recipient, can confine the
mistaken payer to a personal claim in restitution").
46. Id. ¶¶ 225–29.
47. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.165 (noting "two reasons why . . . the remedy
should be personal, [sic] and not proprietary").
48. See id. ¶ 4.15 ("Most of the cases . . . involving proprietary claims in relation to
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(1) case, A can rescind the contract and reclaim legal or beneficial title to
the disputed asset, but in a Type (2) case, as a general rule, rescission is not
available.49 An unexercised right of rescission gives the claimant "a mere
equity" in the disputed asset.50 A mere equity falls short of beneficial title,
which revests only upon rescission.51 In a Type (1) case, it would be
inconsistent with this distinction to conclude that A retains or acquires a
fully fledged equitable interest from the outset, while in a Type (2) case,
creating an equitable interest in A’s favor "would be to give a better remedy
to someone who has made his own mistake than would be given to
someone whose mistake has been induced by another."52
Furthermore, the Chase Manhattan Bank case—like Case 1, above—
involved the transfer of what Calnan refers to as "bank money," as opposed
to "chattel money."53 By the transfer of "chattel money," he means the
physical delivery of bank notes or coins by the payer to the payee; by the
transfer of "bank money," he means the transfer of funds, normally by
electronic funds transfer, from the payer’s bank to the payee’s bank.54 The
difference is that, in the case of a transfer of chattel money, property passes
by assignment from the payer to the payee. But in the case of a transfer of
bank money, the payment by the payer to the payee is effected by set-off.
vitiated contracts concern payments of money. The classic case in which the problem arises
is where A pays money to B by mistake. That mistake may be induced by a
misrepresentation by B. Alternatively, B may be entirely innocent.").
49. Id. ¶ 4.114.
50. Latec Invs. v Hotel Terrigal (1965) 113 CLR 265, 277 (Austl.).
51. Specifically, beneficial title can be defeated by a bona fide purchaser of the legal
estate for value and without notice of the equitable claim, whereas in the case of a mere
equity, the bona fide purchaser rule is not limited to the case where the purchaser acquires
legal title. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.89 ("If . . . A only has an equity in an asset of
which B is the legal owner, A is entitled to enforce that equity against anyone other than a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice."). American law also recognizes the concept
of a "mere equity" in cases involving voidable title. See Kull, supra note 3, at 281–82
("Fraud or mistake makes a transfer subject to rescission. The transferee has what is called
‘voidable title,’ though the transferee can give good title to a subsequent good faith
purchaser; meanwhile the transferor has what used to be called ‘an equity.’"). But, the
distinction between "equities" and "equitable interests" seems to have been elided. See id. at
265 (using the expressions interchangeably).
52. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.116; see also ¶¶ 4.121–4.124 (explaining, in ¶ 4.123,
that "[t]o create an equitable interest under a constructive trust where recission [sic] is
available would be inconsistent with the doctrine of rescission and to do so where rescission
is not available would be to give the transferor greater rights where the transferee was
innocent than where he was fraudulent").
53. Id. ¶ 4.144.
54. See id. ¶¶ 4.15 et seq. (discussing various payment methods).
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If the payer’s bank happens also to be the payee’s bank, the netting exercise
will be a bilateral one. Calnan writes:
Where the account is in credit, the bank is accordingly authorized and
instructed to make a payment to the payee and to reduce the amount
which it owes to the payer by a corresponding amount. To the extent of
the amount of the payment, the debt owing by the bank to the payer is
extinguished, not transferred. What the payee obtains is a new, direct,
right against the bank for a corresponding amount, not a right over a
debt owing by the bank to the payer.55

In other words, there is a novation, not an assignment.56 If the parties have
different banks, the netting exercise will be a multilateral one. As Calnan
explains, "Multilateral netting involves a contractual arrangement between
the parties whereby they agree to release claims against the others in
consideration for a net claim against, or liability to, one or more of the other
parties. No property passes hands."57
The implication of this analysis is that, in a mistaken payment case
involving the transfer of bank money, B does not receive A’s asset and so,
contrary to what Goulding J. said in the Chase Manhattan Bank case, there
is no basis on which A can be said to have "retained an equitable property"
in the money.58 The only basis on which A could obtain an equitable
proprietary interest would be if the court were to confer one on him by
imposing a remedial constructive trust. However, it is still not settled
whether the remedial constructive trust is available in England, while there
is authority to the effect that, whatever the answer to this question, a

55. Id. ¶ 4.29.
56. See id.¶ 4.29 (citing Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., [1989] Q.B.
728 and R. v. Preddy, [1996] A.C. 815 (House of Lords)).
57. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.34; see also FOX, supra note 43, ¶¶ 5.10–5.22
(discussing payment systems).
58. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.126. In the Chase Manhattan Bank case, the payment
was made by electronic funds transfer and the question was raised whether the plaintiff
could identify any particular assets to which a constructive trust might attach. Goulding J.
dismissed the suggestion saying simply that "when equitable rights are in question, the court
does not encourage fine distinctions founded on the technicalities of financial machinery."
Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd, [1981] Ch. 105, 121,
quoted in CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.145. As mentioned above, In re Berry, 147 F. 208 (2d
Cir. 1906) was one of the cases relied on in Chase Manhattan, but the decision in Berry
proceeds on the assumption that the transfer of bank money is analogous to the transfer of
chattel money. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.144 (explaining that "[t]he main American
authority on which Goulding J relied was Re Berry").
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remedial constructive trust cannot be imposed if the defendant is
insolvent.59 More fundamentally, while
[t]here is no doubt that the crediting of B’s account represents value
received by B which can form the subject matter of a personal claim for
repayment[,] B has not received A’s asset and therefore the imposition
of an equitable proprietary interest involves the establishment of a
constructive trust over an asset which A has never owned.60

This aspect of Calnan’s analysis leads to the troubling conclusion that
A’s rights may vary depending on whether the payment happens to have
been made in bank money or chattel money. By contrast, David Fox argues
that "the law should aim for functionally equivalent outcomes regardless of
whether money is paid in corporeal or incorporeal form."61 He goes on to
suggest that the solution lies in applying to bank money transfers the tracing
rule that property rights can be created in substituted assets which are
obtained in an unauthorized exchange:
To the extent that [A’s] decision to transfer the funds represented by the
original chose in action is vitiated, it can be said that the substitution of
the funds in [B’s] account for the funds originally in [A’s] account was
unauthorized by [A]. [A] accordingly takes a title to the traceable
proceeds in [B’s] bank account. [B’s] primary legal title to the proceeds
is taken subject to [A’s competing title] arising through the unauthorized
substitution. If [A] elects to enforce [its] title, [it] may enforce a
proprietary claim to the proceeds.62

However, the practical significance of this proposition is limited in
mistaken payment cases because the enforcement of A’s proprietary claim
depends on the proceeds remaining traceable and, as Fox acknowledges:
[T]he consequence of the limitations imposed on the Chase Manhattan
case by the House of Lords in [Westdeutsche] is that there are now
likely to be insuperable obstacles to applying the reasoning in Chase
Manhattan to mistaken payments made through a payment mechanism.
In most instances, a mistaken payment would not be traceable unless the

59. See Re Polly Peck (No.2), [1998] 3 All ER 812, 827–32 discussed in CALNAN,
supra note 8, ¶¶ 1.89–1.92 (discussing English law in light of other jurisdictions). The
position is the same in other parts of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Canada
which does recognize a remedial constructive trust along the lines of the American model.
See, e.g., Pettkus v. Becker (1989), 117 D.L.R. 3d 257 (S.C.C.) (awarding constructive trust
relief in a property dispute following breakdown of a de facto marital relationship).
60. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.126.
61. FOX, supra note 43, ¶ 1.101.
62. Id. ¶ 5.83.
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beneficiary realized the mistake as soon as the money was credited to
his or her account.63

Calnan says that "[t]he absence of a proprietary remedy should not
come as any surprise. A will have a personal remedy against B for a
mistaken payment, and there seems to be no reason why he should also
have a proprietary remedy."64 As for the involuntary creditor argument,65
Calnan points to "the difficulty of trying to rank creditors by reference to
how worthy they are to receive payment from the debtor."66 It is not selfevidently true, he suggests, that a person who has deliberately provided
credit to the debtor should rank behind someone who has not, or that a
restitutionary claimant should always take priority over a contractual one.
Moreover, giving restitutionary claimants special treatment opens the door
for other types of creditors to claim priority (for example, tort victims or
claimants with special needs), but adjudicating such claims is likely to be
expensive and time-consuming to the detriment of the creditors
collectively.67 As Calnan explains, "The real advantage of the pari passu
principle is not that it provides perfect justice but that it enables there to be
a distribution of the assets of the debtor amongst his creditors in a
reasonably fair and straightforward (and therefore cost-effective) way."68
C. Discussion
If the function of a restatement is to set out the law as it is, rather than
to suggest what the law should be, it is hard to quarrel with the
Restatement’s treatment of the mistaken payment question.69 As the
Restatement itself points out, American law on Case 1-type disputes is well
settled in A’s favor: The availability of constructive trust relief for
mistaken payment claims and the like was "a legal commonplace" even at
the time of Cardozo J.’s statement,70 while the constructive trust’s priority
63. Id. ¶ 5.144.
64. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.127.
65. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (discussing involuntary creditors).
66. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.151.
67. Id. (noting "the difficulty of trying to rank creditors by reference to how worthy
they are to receive payment from the debtor").
68. Id. ¶ 1.152.
69. For a survey of competing views on the role of the Restatements in law reform, see
Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40
IND. L. REV. 205 (2007).
70. RESTATEMENT § 55 Reporter’s Note cmt. a.
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in insolvency proceedings engages a dispute which "is not decades but
centuries old. [I]t is the contest between the judgment creditor and the
holder of a prior equitable interest affecting the judgment debtor’s apparent
title to property. As a matter of non-bankruptcy law, the outcome of this
contest is not in doubt," while Federal bankruptcy law has typically
recognized state law property rights and there is nothing in the history or
text of the current Bankruptcy Code to upset this tradition. "This is not to
say that the choice made by the courts is self-evidently desirable as a matter
of policy," but it is up to Congress to eliminate A’s priority if it thinks
necessary.71 Some American courts have accepted policy arguments
similar to Calnan’s, denying constructive trust relief in the defendant’s
bankruptcy on the ground that it violates the pari passu principle.72 True to
form, the Restatement criticizes these aberrant case law developments, not
explicitly on policy grounds but, rather, because they fly in the face of
settled case law and because there is no legislative basis for them in the
Bankruptcy Code.73
A principal justification for the constructive trust remedy in mistaken
payment cases is that the disputed funds belong in equity to the payer and
so limiting the payer to a personal claim in the defendant’s bankruptcy
would be "robbing Peter to pay Paul." As discussed above, the weakness in
this argument is that it begs the question concerning the existence of the
payer’s title. However, this feature is not unique to the mistaken payment
context. Equitable proprietary interests rest on the maxim that "equity
deems as done what ought to be done" and the application of this maxim
inevitably results in arguments that are question-begging, conclusory or
circular. Even the most familiar of equitable entitlements, such as the
interest of a trust beneficiary and the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, are
71. RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. f.
72. See, e.g., XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Group Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443,
1452 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Constructive trusts are anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since
they take from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not from the offending
debtor."). For a critical analysis of the case, see Kull, supra note 3.
73. The Restatement explains:
If § 544(a)(3) gives the trustee the full powers of a bona fide purchaser to take
property of the debtor free of prior equities—including interests created by law
and not susceptible of record—it awards the trustee a power that the judicial lien
creditor has for centuries been denied. The result would be nothing less than a
revolution in the law of priorities—not just in the common law and equity
jurisprudence of the states, but in the consistent practice under the Bankruptcy
Act.
RESTATEMENT § 60 reporter’s note cmt. f.
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subject to these logical infirmities. What happens is that, with the passing
of time and the accumulation of case law, the logical infirmities end up
being forgotten, stare decisis kicks in, and the accumulated case law itself
becomes the basis of the claim.
The differences between the American and English positions identified
above can probably be accounted for on the basis that the two legal systems
are at different stages of development on this particular issue. In the United
States, the availability of constructive trust relief in mistaken payment cases
is long-settled and so it is probably too late now for the courts to revisit the
underlying policy questions. If change is required, legislative intervention
is now the only available option. English and Commonwealth courts, by
contrast, are working with a relatively clean slate and so they still have
room both to question the logical underpinnings of constructive trust relief
in mistaken payment cases and to shape the law by reference to the
doctrinal and policy issues discussed above. Ultimately, the question boils
down to a choice between, on the one hand, maximizing the value of the
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the creditors collectively, even if this
means doing rough justice to some types of claim and, on the other hand,
striving to achieve a higher form of justice for certain individual claimants
even if this means diminishing the returns to the creditors as a group.
The tension between these objectives calls to mind the opposition
between the economic concepts of allocative efficiency (where the concern
is with increasing the size of the pie) and distributional equity (where the
concern is with how the pie is sliced). There may also be a clash of legal
cultures in play, between bankruptcy lawyers on the one hand and
restitution lawyers on the other. It is probably fair to say that restitution
lawyers are by both training and predisposition more likely to favor
individual restitution claims over the collective interest of all the creditors,
while bankruptcy lawyers tend to be skeptical of special claims. Calnan
writes from a bankruptcy viewpoint, while the Restatement, naturally
enough, is written from a restitution standpoint. On this basis, the prospects
for reforms along the line Calnan envisages may depend, at least in part, on
who happens to be behind the wheel at the critical time.
III. Misrepresentation (1)
Case 2. A is induced by B’s misrepresentation to sell Blackacre to B.
B becomes bankrupt before A discovers the misrepresentation. Can A
rescind the contract?
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A. The Restatement
As in Case 1, the answer to the question has important bankruptcy
implications. If A is able to rescind the contract, B’s bankruptcy trustee will
have to re-convey Blackacre to A and, in the meantime, the trustee holds the
property on constructive trust for A. The upshot is that A recovers the
property in specie, pro tanto diminishing the amount available for
distribution among B’s other creditors. On the other hand, if A cannot
rescind, she will be limited to a personal claim for damages ranking on a
pari passu basis with B’s other unsecured creditors.74 The governing
Restatement provisions are Sections 13, 54, and 60.
Section 13 provides in relevant part as follows:
§13. Fraud and Misrepresentation: Rescission
(1) A transfer induced by fraud or by material misrepresentation is
subject to rescission and restitution. The transferee is liable in
restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.75

Section 54 provides in part:
§ 54. Rescission and Restitution
(1) A person who has transferred money or other property may avoid the
legal effect of the transaction and recover the property transferred if
(a) the transaction is invalid or subject to avoidance for a reason
identified in another section of this Restatement, and
(b) the requirements of this Section may be satisfied.76

The provision goes on to specify that: rescission requires a mutual
restoration and accounting between the parties which involves, among other
things, restoring property received from the other; a pre-condition for
rescission is restoration of the defendant to the status quo ante; and
rescission is a discretionary remedy, subject to "the interests of justice" and,
in particular, under Section 54(4)(c), "[i]f rescission would prejudice
intervening rights of third parties, the remedy will on that account be
denied."77 Comment l, Rights of third parties, explains that this provision
refers to "someone who has acquired an interest in the property, such as a
74. See RESTATEMENT § 13 cmt. i (discussing the "two-step remedial process" of
"[r]escission of a completed transfer").
75. Id. § 13(1).
76. Id. § 54.
77. Id. § 54(4)(c).
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mortgagee or other purchaser for value, through subsequent dealings with
the original transferee."78 In other words, the provision complements
Section 60 which, as noted above, adds the rider that, for the purpose of the
rule, a judicial lien creditor is not a purchaser.79
Section 13 establishes that, on the facts of Case 2, A may rescind the
contract. Section 54 reaffirms this proposition and also establishes that,
upon rescission, A becomes entitled to a reconveyance of Blackacre.
Restatement Section 54 Illustration 2 confirms this analysis:
A conveys Blackacre to B in exchange for B’s promise to pay $100,000
one year later. B fails to pay, whereupon A discovers that the
transaction was induced by B’s fraud. A can enforce B’s contractual
obligation to pay. Alternatively, A may choose to rescind the
conveyance and recover Blackacre from B . . . . Specific relief to A
might be described in terms of rescission, or cancellation, or
constructive trust, or quieting title in A, or by an order directing B to
reconvey to A. The language employed makes no difference to the
outcome.80

Section 60 establishes that A’s right of rescission has priority over a judicial
lien creditor and, by extension, B’s trustee in bankruptcy. Restatement
Section 60 Illustration 3 confirms this proposition:
Victim conveys Blackacre to Swindler, induced by Swindler’s
fraudulent misrepresentations . . . Creditor obtains a judgment against
Swindler for $50,000. By statute, Creditor’s judgment becomes a lien
on all of Swindler’s interests in real property within the jurisdiction . . .
In a contest between Victim and Swindler, Victim would be entitled to
restitution of Blackacre . . . Creditor’s judgment lien attaches only to
Swindler’s interest in Blackacre. Because a judicial lien creditor is not a
purchaser for value, Creditor acquires no better rights vis-à-vis Victim
than Swindler had. Victim recovers Blackacre . . . free of Creditor’s
judgment lien.81

B. English and Commonwealth Law
English and Commonwealth law is similar. Calnan writes:

78. Id. cmt. l.
79. See id. § 60(1) ("Acquisition of a judicial lien (by attachment, garnishment,
judgment, execution, or the like) does not make the lien creditor a purchaser of the property
subject to lien.").
80. Id. § 54 cmt. d, illus. 2.
81. Id. § 60 cmt. c, illus. 3.
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The cases . . . establish the general proposition that, if A transfers title in
an asset to B as a result of a vitiating factor induced by B (such as B’s
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence) then, on
discovering the true facts:
•

A can rescind the contract; and

•

the effect of the rescission is to revest title to the asset in A.82

Following rescission, beneficial title to Blackacre revests in A pending
reconveyance of the legal estate by B’s trustee in bankruptcy. Prior to
rescission, A has a lesser proprietary interest in Blackacre, which is referred
to as "an equity" or a "mere equity" and which is a function of A’s as yet
unexercised right to rescind the contract. A’s equity is enforceable in B’s
bankruptcy. A leading case is In re Eastgate, Ex parte Ward,83 where the
court said:
Now did the property at the time [of A’s rescission] form part of the
estate of the bankrupt? I do not think it did, and for this reason. I think
that the trustee acquired the interest of the bankrupt in the property
subject to the rights of third parties. One of those rights in this case was
the right of the vendors of the goods to disaffirm the contract and to
retake possession of the goods.84

Calnan suggests that, if the matter were free from authority, it would
be open to question whether A should have a proprietary claim in these
circumstances.85 It is true that B’s representation entitles A to rescind the
contract, but the remedy could be administered on a purely personal basis,
by means of an accounting between the parties. On that approach, A would
obtain no advantage over B’s general creditors and would be entitled to
share in the bankruptcy distribution on a pari passu basis only.86 However,
the case law to the contrary is settled and it is too late now to wind back the
clock.

82. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.76.
83. In re Eastgate, Ex parte Ward, [1905] 1 K.B. 465, 467 (holding that a vendor could
take back goods for which a bankrupt never paid).
84. Id. at 467; see also Tilley v. Bowman, [1910] 1 K.B. 745 (applying Eastgate).
85. See CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.75 ("If the issue were free from authority, one
might ask why he should be able to do so.").
86. See id. ¶ 4.75 ("A can seek to have the transaction set aside . . . . But that remedy
could be entirely personal . . . . It does not necessarily follow that a right to rescind should
carry with it the automatic revesting of a proprietary interest by the act of rescission.").
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IV. Misrepresentation (2)

Case 3. A is induced by B’s fraudulent misrepresentation to lend
$500,000 to B. B banks the money but becomes bankrupt before disbursing
any of the funds and before A discovers the misrepresentation. There are
no other funds in the account. Can A rescind the loan contract with B?
A. The Restatement
According to the Restatement, American law treats this case the same
as Case 2. In other words, it makes no difference that the disputed subjectmatter is money rather than land or other property. Restatement Section 60,
Illustration 6 confirms this conclusion:
Customers remit $500,000 to Investment Co. for purposes of
investment. Discovering thereafter that they had been defrauded,
Customers bring suit for rescission and restitution against Investment
Co. The court issues an order barring disbursement of the $200,000
balance of Investment Co.’s account with Bank. While Customers’ suit
is pending, Creditor obtains a judgment against Investment Co. for
$50,000 in unpaid bills and a lien by garnishment of Investment Co.’s
account with Bank. Creditor intervenes in Customers’ action against
Investment Co. and Bank to assert the priority of his lien. The court
determines that the whole of the $200,000 balance held by Bank can be
traced to Customers’ most recent remittances to Investment Co.; by
contrast, Creditor does not assert that any part of the balance is the
product of his property. Because Investment Co. holds the $200,000 in
constructive trust for Customers, the funds are not property of
Investment Co. to which Creditor’s garnishment lien can attach. Bank
will be directed to pay $200,000 to Customers and nothing to Creditor.87

For reasons previously discussed, the result would be the same if the
dispute had been between Customers and Investment Co.’s trustee in
bankruptcy.
B. English and Commonwealth Law
There are cases suggesting that English and Commonwealth law is
consistent with the position as set out in the Restatement. For example, in
87. RESTATEMENT § 60 cmt. c, illus. 6; see also id. § 13 cmt. h, illus. 26 (discussing
constructive trust protecting funds of victim of embezzlement from a tax lien); id. § 60 cmt.
f, illus. 14 (discussing considerations of priority in bankruptcy).
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El-Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings,88 Millett J. said that, if a person "[has]
been induced to purchase . . . shares by false and fraudulent
misrepresentations, they are entitled to rescind the transaction and revest
the equitable title to the purchase money in themselves, at least to the extent
necessary to support an equitable tracing claim."89 However, Calnan
disputes the correctness of these decisions on the ground that they overlook
the distinction between transfers of chattel money and payments of bank
money:
[P]ayments of bank money do not result in A’s asset coming into the
hands of B. Value passes from A to B by crediting and debiting
accounts with third parties, not by the transfer of any asset from A to B.
In principle, therefore, it would seem that rescission can have only a
personal, and not a proprietary, effect in the case of payments of money.
On rescission, an asset which has been transferred by A to B will revest
in A. With a money payment, no asset passes from A to B, and there is
therefore nothing which A can identify in B’s hands as being an asset
which A originally owned.90

Fox takes a different view, relying on the principle that "property
rights can be created in substituted assets which are obtained in an
unauthorized exchange."91 He says: "Once the court ordered rescission of
the transaction, [B] would hold his or her legal interest in the traceable
credit balance in his or her account on resulting trust for [A]. If [B] were
the fraudster, then [A] could also elect to assert an equitable lien over the
account."92
Moreover, A "would be better placed to trace and recover a voidable
payment" in a misrepresentation case (Case 3) than she would in a mistaken
payment case (Case 1).93 This is because, in Case 3, the ground for A’s
rescission is B’s wrongful conduct and, if B is "a wrongdoer from the
outset, [A can] rely from that point on the more favourable evidential
88. El-Ajou v. Dollar Land Holding Plc (No. 1), [1993] B.C.C. 698, 713 (ruling that
once one "rescind[s] . . . purchases for fraud [he] can then invoke the assistance of equity to
follow property of which he is the equitable owner").
89. Id.; see also Daly v Sydney Stock Exch. (1986) 160 CLR 371, 387 (Austl.)
("Irrespective of the fairness of its terms, equity regards a contract made between a fiduciary
and the person to whom he stands in a fiduciary relationship as voidable if the fiduciary has
breached his fiduciary duty in respect of the contract.") (Brennan, J.).
90. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 4.105.
91. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (distinguishing novation from
assignment).
92. FOX, supra note 43, ¶ 5.151.
93. Id. ¶ 5.152.
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presumptions to trace the value represented by his payment [into B’s]
account. [B] would not encounter the problem faced by the mistaken
originator of money in the period before [B] realized the originator’s
mistake."94
C. Discussion
Calnan concedes that in a situation like Case 2, above, A has a
proprietary claim which gives it priority in B’s bankruptcy, but this is only
because there is settled case law on point. However, he argues that the
cases are contrary to principle and that, in principle, A should be limited to
a personal claim. In a Case 3-type situation, the case law is less settled and
this allows him to take a more robust stance, arguing that the cases are
wrong and should not be followed in future. However, Fox takes a contrary
view of the English position which appears to be more in line with United
States law, as represented in the Restatement. Which of these conflicting
approaches is preferable from a policy standpoint?
The policy arguments in support of the United States approach are
basically the same as in the mistaken payments case:
[A] prevails over the creditors because, unlike them, he has not
consented to be a creditor of the debtor. Property obtained by fraud or
mistake, like property obtained by theft, has not come into possession of
the debtor by a voluntary transaction. To distribute it to creditors would
therefore result in an involuntary transfer, accomplished in two stages,
from claimant to creditors.95

94. Id. ¶ 5.152; cf. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 4.126, 9.93 (arguing that neither a
resulting trust nor a constructive trust is appropriate in the circumstances). Calnan writes:
[As for the resulting trust], there is no basis on which A, having paid money to B
through bank accounts, could be held to have retained a proprietary interest in
his asset. The only basis on which A could obtain an equitable proprietary
interest would be by the law imposing one (by way of constructive trust) over
that part of its credit balance with its bank which represents the mistaken
payment. . . .
Id. ¶ 4.126. He adds:
A constructive trust should not be imposed where the asset [A receives] is
money. In such a case, the maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to
be done can have no application, because there is unlikely to be an identifiable
asset over which a trust can be created and, in any event, what ought to be done
is to pay an equivalent amount, not to transfer the money received.
Id. ¶ 9.93.
95. Kull, supra note 3, at 282.
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In other words, A deserves priority because: (1) he has a proprietary
claim to the disputed asset; and (2) he is an involuntary creditor. However,
the argument is contentious. The first limb presupposes that A has a
proprietary claim, but that is the very point at issue.96 The second limb
assumes that involuntary creditors deserve priority over voluntary creditors
because they have not assumed the risk of the defendant’s bankruptcy. But
this is not self-evidently true and, in any event, attempts to discriminate
between unsecured creditors are likely to promote costly litigation which
will erode the value of the estate. This is even more of a concern in
misrepresentation cases than it is in the mistaken payments context. At
least in a mistaken payment case, once the claimant has established the
basic facts, the conclusion that he is an involuntary creditor will be
relatively uncontroversial. But in a misrepresentation case, the plaintiff’s
status as an involuntary creditor will often be contentious. For example, if
the defendant tricks the plaintiff into a transfer of the disputed asset, it
could be argued that the plaintiff is an involuntary creditor because the
defendant’s conduct subverted the plaintiff’s choice.
On the other hand, it could just as plausibly be argued that the risk of
fraud is an incident of contracting and, while it justifies a remedy, it does
not justify giving the plaintiff priority in the defendant’s bankruptcy. Emily
Sherwin says that the distinction turns on a number of variables including
96. At least as a matter of English and Commonwealth law, the theft analogy is open
to question because, in the case of theft, the victim has no intention of transferring the
disputed asset to the thief, whereas in a mistaken payment or misrepresentation case, the
mistake or misrepresentation does not negate intention; it simply means the transferor’s
intention was formed on a false basis. See FOX, supra note 43, ¶¶ 4.86–4.91 (discussing
theft of corporeal money (chattel money)); id. ¶¶ 5.121–5.130 (discussing theft of
incorporeal money (bank money)); id. ¶¶ 6.03–6.18 (discussing voidable transfers and
rescission). In Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson, [2004] 1 A.C. 919 (H.L.), the following
statement appears:
Fraud does not negative intention. A person’s intention is a state of mind. Fraud
does not negative a state of mind.
The existence of a fraudulent
misrepresentation means that a person’s intention is formed on a false basis—a
basis, moreover, known by the other party to be false. The effect of fraud is to
negative legal rights or obligations flowing from an intention to enter into a
contract . . . . This distinction, between negativing intention or consent and
negativing the rights otherwise flowing from intention or consent, is important.
It explains why the law treats a contract induced by fraud as voidable, not void.
The necessary coincidence of intention, or consensus ad idem, may exist even
where the intention and consent of the victim were induced by fraud. An
intention thus induced is regarded by the law as sufficient to found a contract,
even though the victim may repudiate the contract as soon as he discovers the
fraud.
Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson, [2004] 1 A.C. 919, 932 (H.L.) (Lord Nicholls).
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the nature of the fraud and the plaintiff’s commercial sophistication and that
"the constructive trust claimant’s position as a voluntary creditor is a
question of degree."97 But answers to questions of degree are hard to
anticipate in advance, and so an approach like the one Sherwin describes
would increase the uncertainty of litigation outcomes. In this connection, a
leading Canadian text remarks that:
all else being equal, society as a whole has an interest in a system that
minimizes the costs associated with the resolution of restitutionary
claims and the effects of insolvency. Consequently, a complicated
regime that turns largely on judicial discretion may be undesirable
insofar as it inhibits settlements and encourages litigation.98

Kull’s analysis of the Omegas Group case illustrates the concern
nicely. There the claimant paid the debtor in advance for computers the
debtor was to purchase from IBM on the claimant’s behalf. The debtor
became bankrupt and the claimant, arguing that its payments were induced
by the debtor’s fraudulent misrepresentations, claimed a constructive trust
over the disputed funds in the debtor’s hands. According to Kull, the
question the court should have asked (but did not) is whether the claimant
had been "so far deceived about the risks it was running that in advancing
funds to [the debtor] it did not act voluntarily."99 The question is a close
call:
On the one hand, late period transactions of this kind occur closer in
time to the bankruptcy, inspiring the claim that the debtor has made
(implicitly or otherwise) fraudulent representations of solvency. On the
other hand, a late-period seller—by comparison with creditors of longer
standing—is likely to have dealt with the debtor on the basis of a higher
appraisal of the risk of insolvency. Any perceived decline in the
debtor’s creditworthiness will have been compensated for by more
favorable terms.100

97. Sherwin, supra note 31, at 352. As Kull explains:
[T]he issue of restitution in bankruptcy ultimately depends on a comparison of
the respective positions of the restitution claimant and the general creditors visà-vis the debtor. The stronger the showing that the debtor holds property
obtained in a nonconsensual transfer, the stronger the case for restitution to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the general creditors at the expense of the
claimant.
Kull, supra note 3, at 274.
98. A.H. OOSTERHOFF ET AL., OOSTERHOFF ON TRUSTS 792–93 (7th ed. 2009).
99. Kull, supra note 3, at 274.
100. Id. at 274–75.
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In the Omegas Group case itself, it seems there was evidence to
support the latter hypothesis, but in other cases the indications may be less
clear and it may not be so easy for the court to arrive at the correct
interpretation of the facts or for the parties to predict in advance of the case
what the court’s decision might be.
V. Wrongful Gains
Case 4. A engages B, a real estate agent, to purchase a commercial
property on A’s behalf. B purchases the property for himself at a price of
$500,000, concealing the purchase from A by telling him that the vendor
has changed his mind about selling. B goes into bankruptcy. Can A claim
a constructive trust over the property?
A. The Restatement
Case 4 is a variation on the facts of a Supreme Court of Canada case,
Soulos v. Korkontzilas,101 an important difference being that, in Soulos, the
defendant was not insolvent. Comparable American cases include Funk v.
Tifft,102 Quinn v. Phipps,103 and H-B Ltd. Partnership v. Wimmer.104 The
governing Restatement provisions are Sections 43, 55, and 60. Section 43
provides in part that a person who obtains a benefit in breach of a fiduciary
duty is accountable for the benefit so obtained to the person to whom the
duty is owed.105 As previously seen, Section 55 provides for constructive
trust relief in cases where a recipient is unjustly enriched by the acquisition
of property "in violation of the claimant’s rights,"106 while Section 60 as a
101. See Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 1 (Can.) (holding that "a
constructive trust over property may be imposed in the absence of enrichment of the
defendant and corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff").
102. See Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24–27 (9th Cir. 1975) (imposing a constructive
trust over land which a real estate agent and others bought after a third party had already
agreed to buy the land).
103. See Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 425–27 (Fla. 1927) (imposing a constructive
trust over land in favour of a purchaser).
104. See H-B Ltd. P’ship v. Wimmer, 257 S.E.2d 770, 774 (Va. 1979) (finding a
constructive trust over land in favor of principals whose agent bought the land for himself in
violation of his fiduciary duties).
105. See RESTATEMENT § 43 ("A person who obtains a benefit (a) in breach of a
fiduciary duty . . . is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed.").
106. Id. § 55.
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general rule gives priority to constructive trust claims and the like in the
defendant’s insolvency.107
In Case 4, A and B’s relationship is a fiduciary one and B’s conduct
amounts to a breach of fiduciary obligation. Restatement Section 43
establishes B’s obligation to account for the benefit he has obtained, while
Section 55 establishes A’s right to constructive trust relief. Restatement
Section 43 Illustration 10 confirms this analysis:
Purchaser retains Broker to assist him in acquiring Blackacre, offering to
pay $50,000 for the property plus a 10 percent commission. Broker
undertakes to locate the owner of Blackacre and to transmit Purchaser’s
offer. Broker buys Blackacre himself for $30,000. The agreement
between Purchaser and Broker, not being in writing, is unenforceable
under local law, but Broker has nevertheless violated his duty of loyalty to
Purchaser. Purchaser may obtain ownership of Blackacre via constructive
trust, on payment to Broker of $30,000 without commission
(§ 51(5)(c)).108

Section 60 gives A’s constructive trust priority over B’s trustee in
bankruptcy.109
Assume Blackacre increases in value after B acquires it and, at the date
of the trial, it is worth $750,000. Restatement Section 61 provides that:
When restitution is based on a wrongful interference with the claimant’s
legally protected interests, the claimant may have a prima facie
entitlement (as against a recipient at fault or a successor in interest) to a
recovery exceeding the amount of the claimant’s loss. In such a case,
however,
(a) the portion of the restitution claim exceeding the claimant’s loss
110
is subordinated to the claims of the recipient’s creditors . . . .

In the case under consideration, A’s loss is not limited to the value of
Blackacre at the time of B’s wrongdoing ($500,000). It extends to
Blackacre’s current value ($750,000) because, but for B’s wrongful conduct,
the increase in value would have belonged to A. In short, on these facts
Restatement Section 61 does not limit A’s recovery.
Now assume that Blackacre drops in value after B acquires it so that, at
the date of the trial, it is worth only $300,000. On these facts, A suffers no
107. See id. § 60 ("Except as otherwise provided by statute and by § 61, a right to
restitution from identifiable property is superior to the competing rights of a creditor of the
recipient who is not a bona fide purchaser or payee of the property in question.").
108. Id. § 43 cmt. d, illus. 10.
109. See Quinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 419, 420–32 (Fla. 1927) (discussing priority).
110. RESTATEMENT § 61.
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monetary loss as a consequence of B’s wrongdoing. On the contrary, he is
apparently better off because B’s intervention has enabled him to avoid a
bad bargain. In normal circumstances, therefore, one would expect A not to
pursue his claim against B. But suppose that A has a sentimental
attachment to Blackacre and wants the property regardless of its drop in
value.111 If B were solvent, A would be entitled to constructive trust relief,
conditional on paying B’s $500,000 outlay on Blackacre. The justification
is that the function of the constructive trust remedy in fiduciary cases is not
just to reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment, but also to deter fiduciary
wrongdoing and, as the Restatement points out, "[t]o this end, a liability in
restitution by the rule of [Section 43] does not depend on proof either that
the claimant has sustained quantifiable economic injury or that the
defendant has earned a net profit from the transaction."112
However, in the case under consideration, B is insolvent and so
Restatement Section 61 applies. Since A has suffered no quantifiable
economic loss, the result will be to subordinate his constructive trust claim
to B’s general creditors. The justification is that the deterrence rationale for
constructive trust relief has no application in the defendant’s bankruptcy:
[T]he justification of the remedy disappears if a supracompensatory
award to the restitution claimant would come at the expense of a third
party [the defendant’s unsecured creditors] who is innocent of the
underlying wrong . . . [T]he standard justifications for a recovery in
restitution exceeding the claimant’s loss—whether expressed in the
language of unjust enrichment, or in terms of economic incentives—
have [no] bearing on a case in which the interests opposed to the
restitution claim are those of the wrongdoer’s general creditors. The
creditors are not enriched in consequence of their own wrong, nor have
they engaged in profitable misconduct from which a disgorgement
liability will potentially deter them.113

Ironically, on the facts in question, the result Restatement Section 61
leads to may not appeal to B’s trustee in bankruptcy. A’s constructive trust
probably does not prejudice the unsecured creditors because they will have
no special attachment to Blackacre and so removal of the property from the
estate would not diminish the pool of assets available for distribution. On
the contrary, given A’s undertaking to reimburse B’s outlay, the property’s
111. See, e.g., Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (holding that a real
estate agent who had purchased land for himself in breach of fiduciary duty to his client held
the property on constructive trust for the client).
112. RESTATEMENT § 43 cmt. b.
113. Id. § 61 cmt. a–b.
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removal may actually increase the asset pool by ridding the estate of a bad
bargain. If so, B’s trustee will contract around his Section 61 rights and
admit A’s claim.
The bribe cases offer a perhaps more salient example of the problem
under consideration. To adapt the facts of the famous English case, Lister
& Co. v. Stubbs,114 assume B is employed by A as a purchasing officer. B
accepts secret commissions from a supplier, C, in return for purchasing
supplies from C. B uses the money profitably to buy shares. However, B
accumulates significant debts and ends up in bankruptcy. Can A claim a
constructive trust over the shares? As in the previous examples, under
Section 43, B’s conduct is in breach of fiduciary obligation and so B must
account to A for the benefit he has obtained. If B were solvent, under
Section 55 A would be entitled to a constructive trust over B’s share
portfolio on the basis that the shares are traceable proceeds of the bribe
money. Restatement Section 55 Illustration 28, which is based on the
facts of Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid,115 confirms this
analysis:
Prosecutor accepts $1 million in bribes in exchange for favorable
treatment of criminals. Prosecutor is liable to State in restitution for
the amount of the bribes and any profits derived therefrom (§§ 43, 51).
To the extent that any portion of the money paid as bribes and its
traceable product may be identified in Prosecutor’s bank accounts
(applying the tracing rules of § 59), Prosecutor holds those funds in
constructive trust for State. State establishes at trial that Prosecutor
used bribe money to purchase two houses, giving one to his Wife and
the other to his Lawyer (as payment for legal services). Wife had no
notice of the source of the funds, but she took her house as donee.
Lawyer took the house for value, but with notice that it was purchased
with bribe money. Both Wife and Lawyer hold their houses in
constructive trust for State.116

However, since B is bankrupt, A will be limited to a money claim for
the amount of his loss, secured by an equitable lien on the shares:117
114. See Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, (1890) L.R. 45 Ch.D. 1, 14 (Eng.) (holding that where
a defendant who obtains secret profits in breach of fiduciary obligation, the plaintiff is
entitled only to a money remedy for an amount equivalent to the profits unlawfully
obtained).
115. See Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 324 (P.C.) 331
(appeal taken from N.Z.) (ruling that "[w]hen a bribe is accepted by a fiduciary in breach of
his duty then he holds that bribe in trust for the person to whom the duty was owed"); see
also RESTATEMENT § 55 reporter’s note cmt. m (noting Reid as the basis for the illustration).
116. RESTATEMENT § 55 cmt. m, illus. 28.
117. See RESTATEMENT §§ 60–61.
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Restatement, Sections 60 and 61. Restatement Section 61 Illustration 1
confirms this analysis:
Treasurer embezzles $40,000 from Township, using these funds to
acquire goods. When the theft is discovered, the goods (constituting the
traceable product of the embezzled funds) are worth $50,000. In a twoparty contest between Township and Treasurer, Township would be
entitled to ownership of the goods via a constructive trust, despite the
fact that such a remedy gives Township more than it lost. Because
Treasurer is insolvent, however, restitution to Township via constructive
trust would be made at the expense of Treasurer’s creditors. In these
circumstances, Township’s restitution claim has its ordinary priority
(§ 60(1)) only to the extent of Township’s loss from Treasurer’s
embezzlement ($40,000 plus interest). Correct priority is achieved by
awarding Township an equitable lien on the goods in the amount of
$40,000 plus interest, rather than a constructive trust.118

The challenge in the bribe cases is to quantify A’s loss for the purposes
of the rule in Restatement Section 61. In contrast to the TreasurerTownship example, A’s loss does not correspond to B’s gain because the
bribe moneys never belonged to A. In a Lister & Co. v. Stubbs-type case,
A’s loss is presumably the supra-competitive prices it paid for supplies as a
result of the defendant’s conduct, while in Reid’s case, the plaintiff’s loss
was the damage done to the criminal justice system. However, this amount
may be impossible to measure in money terms and the implication, in the
context of Restatement Section 61, is that the claimant will be denied
recovery.
B. English and Commonwealth Law
There are numerous cases in England and the Commonwealth which
support constructive trust relief for breach of fiduciary obligation.119
However, none of the cases—at least the leading ones—involves an
insolvent defendant and so there is no clear authority on the question at
hand. For example, it is unclear what the decision in Soulos v. Korkontzilas
might have been if the defendant were bankrupt. Canadian law recognizes
118. Id. § 61 cmt. b, illus. 1.
119. See, e.g., Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.) 103 (stating that "an agent
is . . . liable to account for profits he makes out of trust property if there is a possibility of
conflict between his interest and his duty to his principal") (Lord Cohen). But for a critical
analysis of these cases, see Sinclair Invs. (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Fin. Ltd., [2010]
EWHC (Ch) 1614.
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the remedial constructive trust, which is a discretionary remedy. However,
the discretion can cut both ways: in other words, the court could use the
defendant’s bankruptcy as a reason to deny the remedy or, equally, as a
reason to grant it. As suggested above, given the peculiar facts of the case,
a constructive trust would probably not have prejudiced the defendant’s
creditors and so it would have made sense to grant the remedy. However,
not all cases are the same in this respect.
England and other parts of the Commonwealth, Canada aside, have not
yet embraced the remedial constructive trust. Instead, the constructive trust
is a form of declaratory relief aimed at confirming a pre-existing equitable
proprietary interest. In other words, there is a tendency towards formalism
in the constructive trusts case law, in contrast to the functionalism which
characterizes the Restatement’s approach.
In particular, since the
constructive trust depends upon the establishment of a prior equitable
claim, the courts have less room to maneuver depending on whether or not
the defendant is bankrupt. Perhaps for this reason—and in contrast to the
Restatement—English and Commonwealth law takes an all or nothing
approach to the bankruptcy question. The cases proceed on the assumption
that if constructive trust relief is available outside bankruptcy, it will be
available inside bankruptcy, too, and on the same terms. This leads to a tail
wagging the dog kind of debate, with some courts opposing proprietary
remedies for breach of fiduciary obligations because of the potential
bankruptcy implications, and others favoring them for deterrence reasons,
even if the defendant is bankrupt.
Lister & Co. v. Stubbs and Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid
are the leading cases. In Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, the plaintiff claimed a
constructive trust over the defendant’s second generation profits, but the
Court of Appeal limited him to a personal claim for the amount of the bribe
money. The defendant was not insolvent at the date of the hearing, but the
court was clearly concerned about what might happen if he were to become
insolvent later: "[I]f Stubbs were to become bankrupt, this property
acquired by him with the money paid to him by Messrs Varley would be
withdrawn from the mass of his creditors and be handed over bodily to
Lister & Co. Can that be right?"120
The decision implies that the courts should be wary about granting
constructive trust relief for breach of fiduciary obligation, even if the
defendant is solvent, for fear either that he may not stay solvent or that the
decision will affect the outcome of other cases where the defendant is
120.

Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, (1890) L.R. 45 Ch.D. 1, 15 (Lindley L.J).

PROPRIETARY REMEDIES IN INSOLVENCY

1261

insolvent. In Reid’s case, the Privy Council took precisely the opposite
tack, upholding the constructive trust remedy on deterrence grounds and
dismissing the bankruptcy concerns with the statement that "the unsecured
creditors cannot be in a better position than their debtor."121
The trouble with the Lister & Co. v. Stubbs approach is that it arguably
over-emphasizes bankruptcy considerations at the expense of deterrence
considerations, while the objection to Reid’s case is the mirror-image one.
Subsequent decisions at the trial level go in both directions. For example,
in Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland International Ltd.,122 the court
followed Reid’s case, saying:
There are powerful policy reasons for ensuring that a fiduciary does not
retain gains acquired in violation of fiduciary duty, and I do not consider
that it should make any difference whether the fiduciary is insolvent.
There is no injustice to creditors in their not sharing in an asset for
which the fiduciary has not given value, and which the fiduciary should
not have had.123

On the other hand, in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade
Finance Ltd.,124 the court held that it was bound, as a matter of precedent, to
follow Lister & Co. v. Stubbs (a Court of Appeal decision) in preference to
Reid’s case (a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand).
Given these conflicting decisions, it is impossible to be sure how an English
court would resolve Case 4, though Sinclair Investments must carry some
weight, if only because it is the latest word.125 So far as the law in other
parts of the Commonwealth is concerned Reid’s case is clearly binding
authority in New Zealand, while neither Reid’s case nor Lister & Co. v.
Stubbs is binding in Australia. As previously mentioned, Canada stands on
a different footing: As a matter of Canadian law, it is clear that, but for B’s
bankruptcy, A would be entitled to constructive trust relief, but it is an open
question whether B’s bankruptcy makes a difference.

121. Attorney-Gen. for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 App. Cas. 324 (P.C.) 331 (appeal
taken from N.Z.) ( Lord Templeman).
122. Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland Int’l Ltd. [2004] EWHC (Ch.) 622, [2005]
Ch.119 [51] (ruling that "[a]n agent or other fiduciary who makes a secret profit is
accountable to his or her principal or cestui que trust" in applying Reid’s case).
123. Id. [86].
124. Sinclair Invs. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Versailles Track Fin. Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Ch.) 1614.
125. The case is currently on appeal.
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C. Discussion

In Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, the court limited the plaintiff to a personal
claim for recovery of the bribe money. From a deterrence perspective, the
decision was clearly unsatisfactory because it allowed the defendant to keep
all his second generation gains, so that his bribe-taking ended up being a
very profitable venture. The court could have done better justice to
deterrence considerations, without compromising bankruptcy concerns, by
awarding the plaintiff an account of profits for an amount equal to the
defendant’s second-generation gains and some commentators see this
solution as a way forward.126 However, even this approach may result in
under-deterrence if the second-generation gains comprise an asset for which
B has a special attachment or if there is a chance that the value of the
property might increase after the judgment date. A constructive trust is the
only sure-fire way of reaching all B’s gains.
The Restatement takes a different approach to balancing deterrence
and bankruptcy objectives. On the Restatement approach, the plaintiff’s
claim in Lister & Co. v. Stubbs should have succeeded, because the
defendant was not insolvent; on the other hand, if the defendant had been
insolvent, the plaintiff would have been limited to a claim for the amount of
its loss secured by an equitable lien over the shares. The advantage of the
Restatement’s solution is that it does not compromise the deterrence
objective in cases where the defendant is not insolvent. By the same token,
it avoids exposing creditors to a gains-based remedy in cases where he is.
On the other hand, critics might argue that this concession in the creditors’
favor does not go far enough because the restitution claimant still has
priority for the amount of its loss and so there is the same unanswered
question as the one that arises in the mistaken payment and
misrepresentation cases, namely what makes restitution claims different
enough to warrant special treatment in the defendant’s bankruptcy?
In some situations, for example Reid’s case, it may not be possible to
quantify the amount of the claimant’s loss and, in that event, the effect of
Restatement Section 61, apparently, will be to deny the claimant any
recovery at all if the defendant is insolvent.127 This is harsher even than
Lister & Co. v. Stubbs which, as previously mentioned, would at least give

126. See, e.g., CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 9.81–9.89.
127. See RESTATEMENT § 61 ("When restitution is based on a wrongful interference
with the claimant’s legally protected interests . . . (a) the portion of the restitution claim
exceeding the claimant’s loss is subordinated to the claims of the recipient’s creditors. . . .").
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the claimant a provable claim in the defendant’s bankruptcy for the amount
of the bribe money.
VI. Specific Performance
Case 5. A and B enter into a contract for the sale of Blackacre. A
pays thirty percent of the purchase price on the signing of the contract. B
becomes bankrupt and B’s trustee refuses to complete the transfer. Can A
sue for specific performance?
A. United States Law
The Restatement does not address the issue Case 5 raises because
specific performance is not a restitutionary remedy and so it falls outside
the boundaries of the project. Instead, the answer to the question is to be
found in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing executory
contracts.128 The following discussion is included for the sake of
completeness, but it will be brief since it has nothing immediately to do
with the Restatement, which is presently the main focus.
Bankruptcy Code § 365 gives the trustee a right to reject, affirm and
assign executory contracts, subject to court approval.129 The statute does
not define "executory contract," but it is generally understood to mean a
contract which remains partly unperformed on both sides at the date of the
bankruptcy.130 The contract in Case 5 is an executory contract in this sense.
The trustee’s refusal to complete the transfer is tantamount to a purported
rejection of the contract. The key provision is Bankruptcy Code § 365(i),
which prevents the trustee’s right of rejection from overriding the
purchaser’s claim for specific performance, but only if the purchaser has
gone into possession of the property.131 The provision gives the purchaser
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (addressing executory contracts).
129. See id. ("(a) Except as provided in Sections 765 and 766 . . . and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this Section, the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.").
130. Or, more expansively: "A contract under which the obligations of both the
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973).
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) ("If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the
debtor for the sale of real property . . . under which the purchaser is in possession, such
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in possession the option of treating the contract as terminated or remaining
in possession and continuing to make payments under the contract.132 The
provision goes on to say that the purchaser may offset against the contract
payments any post-rejection damages caused by non-performance of the
debtor’s obligations under the contract and that the trustee must deliver title
to the purchaser but is relieved of all other performance obligations.133
Section 365(j) applies if the purchaser is not in possession and the contract
is rejected, and it gives the purchaser a lien on the debtor’s interest in the
property for the recovery of any part of the purchase price the purchaser has
paid.134 The thinking behind these provisions is that a purchaser in
possession is likely to have spent money on improvements and the like, and
the aim is to protect its reliance interest. (In an extreme case, failure to
protect the purchaser’s reliance interest may trigger the purchaser’s own
financial crisis and this would be a high price to pay for facilitating the
debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings.) On the other hand, the justification for
not extending the protection to purchasers across the board lies in the pari
passu sharing principle.135
Now assume a contract for sale by B to A of a Van Gogh painting,
which is still undelivered at the date B files for bankruptcy. Outside
bankruptcy, A would be entitled to specific performance: damages would
be an inadequate remedy because, given the uniqueness of the contract
subject-matter, there is no market in which A could find a replacement.
Does A’s specific performance claim survive B’s bankruptcy? The
governing provisions are Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(5)(B) and 502(c).
Section 101(5)(B) provides that, for the purposes of the statute, "claim"
purchaser may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in
possession of such real property or timeshare interest.").
132. See id. (giving the purchaser the option).
133. See id. § 365(i)(2) ("If such purchaser remains in possession—(A) [he/she] shall
continue to make all payments due under such contract, but may offset against such
payments any damages occurring after the date of the rejection of such contract by the non
performance of any obligation of the debtor after such date . . . .").
134. See id. § 365(j) ("A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under
subsection (i) of this section . . . has a lien on the interest of the debtor in such property for
the recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such purchaser or party has paid.").
135. More or less the same considerations apply to the rejection of a tenancy agreement
in the landlord’s bankruptcy and the rejection of an intellectual property license in the
bankruptcy of the intellectual property holder, and the Bankruptcy Code treats these cases on
a similar footing. See id. § 365(h) (dealing with the "reject[ion of] an unexpired lease of real
property under which the debtor is the lessor"); id. § 365(n) (dealing with the "reject[ion of]
an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual
property").
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includes the "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance,"136
and § 502(c) provides that, for the purpose of allowing a claim, equitable
remedies such as specific performance are reducible to money value.137
One justification is that the real function of specific performance is to
protect A’s interests in cases where damages are difficult to calculate,138 not
to give A priority in B’s bankruptcy. Therefore, granting A specific
performance in B’s bankruptcy would give her an unbargained benefit.139
An alternative justification is that § 502(c) mitigates A’s prejudice by
giving the bankruptcy court a broad power to estimate claims without the
constraints of state law doctrines about speculative damages.140
B. English and Commonwealth Law
According to Calnan, the English position is that:
•

specific performance will be available to A if he can establish
that he has a proprietary interest in the asset; but

•

specific performance will not be available to A if he does not
have a proprietary interest in the asset.141

Also:
The basic principle is that, once a debtor company enters into insolvency
proceedings, its insolvency officer is entitled to refuse to perform
contracts entered into by the company, with the effect that the creditor
will in most cases have no option but to prove as an unsecured creditor
for damages for breach of contract. This is the corollary of the principle
that specific performance is not available to give effect to a personal
right in insolvency.142
136. Id. § 101(5)(B).
137. Id. § 502(c)(2) (allowing for "any right to payment arising from a right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance").
138. For example, because the asset is unique so that there is no market price the court
can rely on as a basis for valuation, or because the counterparty places a high subjective
value on the asset.
139. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 65–66
(1986) ("In recent contract scholarship the right of specific performance has been
illuminatingly analyzed as a property right. . . . [T]he relevant focus in bankruptcy . . . is a
question of priority, not property.").
140. Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 227, 256–57 (1989) (discussing specific performance in the context of bankruptcy).
141. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 1.83.
142. Id. ¶ 1.94.
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These two passages succinctly state the English position on executory
contracts. The implication of the English position is that the debtor’s
insolvency representative can disclaim, or reject, an uncompleted contract
more or less as of right, unless the contract is specifically enforceable. The
United States position, as represented by Bankruptcy Code § 365, is at least
superficially different because the provision makes rejection of contracts
subject to court approval. However, most courts apply a business judgment
test, which means that the court will approve a proposed rejection unless it
was made in bad faith or involved a breach of discretion, and so in practice
the law is not so different from the English position. Recent amendments to
the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act143 and Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act144 confirm that Canadian law is to more or less the same
effect.
In England, the insolvency representative’s right of disclaimer will be
defeated by the contract counterparty’s (A’s) claim for specific performance
and, according to Calnan, a contract is specifically enforceable in
insolvency proceedings if, and only if, A can establish a proprietary interest
in the disputed asset. It is commonly asserted that the availability of
specific performance is itself the source of proprietary rights because
equity, deeming as done what ought to be done, anticipates the decree.145
However, if this were true, Calnan’s analysis would be circular. Calnan
argues, relying on Tailby v. Official Receiver,146 that the real basis for the
recognition of equitable proprietary entitlements is "that equity will require
a person who has made a promise to comply with it if it is given for good
consideration."147
But this explanation raises the further problem that "[i]t is not every
case in which a person promises to create a proprietary interest over an
identifiable asset that equity will step in and create an immediate equitable

143. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 § 65.1 (addressing the
termination or amendment of agreements in bankruptcy).
144. See Companies’ Creditors Arrangement, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 § 32 (dealing with
companies disclaiming agreements).
145. See, e.g., Holroyd v. Marshall, [1861–1862] 11 E.R. 191 (H.L.) 1005 ("In equity,
the remedy for the assignee of the property would be more complete than at law, for specific
performance might be decreed . . . .").
146. See Tailby v. Official Receiver, [1888] L.R. 13 App. Cas. 523 (H.L.) 536 (holding
that "[w]hen the consideration has been given, and the debt has been clearly identified as one
of those in respect of which it was given, a Court of Equity will enforce the covenant of the
parties . . . .") (Lord Watson).
147. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 5.56.
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proprietary interest."148 For example, equity will intervene if the contract is
one for the sale of land,149 but not if the contract is one for the sale of
goods.150 Calnan’s explanation for the difference, relying in part on In re
Wait,151 is that the rules for passing of property under a contract for the sale
of goods are codified in the sale of goods legislation and the statute leaves
no room for the transfer by sale of equitable entitlements. He justifies the
different rule for land sales on the ground that "the rule is settled" and
suggests that in all other cases, "there is much to be said for the view that
beneficial title should pass with legal title."152 The implication is that, if the
slate were clean, there should be no exception for land sales either.153
Calnan does not address the issue of specifically enforceable contracts for
the sale of goods in bankruptcy (the case of the Van Gogh painting), but, by
implication, the analysis is the same as for land sale contracts. The
Canadian approach to specific performance in bankruptcy is similar to the
English position.154
C. Discussion
To summarize, England and the United States share a common
underlying agenda with regard to specific performance, which is to strike a
148. Id. ¶ 5.59.
149. See Lysaght v. Edwards, [1875–1876] L.R. 2 Ch.D 499 (C.A.) 521–22 (holding
that once a contract for the sale of land is signed, the vendor holds the property on
constructive trust for the purchaser pending conveyance).
150. See In re Wait, [1927] 1 Ch. 606 (C.A.) 621–24 (holding that the sale of goods
legislation prevents a buyer from claiming equitable title) (Lord Hanworth M.R.).
151. See id. at 624 (noting "that the transaction [at issue was] one of the most ordinary
mercantile kind . . . not one of specific trust or appropriation of any particular funds.").
152. CALNAN, supra note 8, ¶ 5.80.
153. Cf. Tanwar Enters. Pty Ltd. v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315, 337–38 (Austl.)
(suggesting that the relationship between parties to an executory contract for the sale of land
is a purely contractual one and not trustee-beneficiary).
154. See Armadale Properties Ltd. v. 700 King St. (1997) Ltd. (2001), 25 C.B.R. 4th
198, para. 12 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (discussing specific performance). In Semelhago v.
Paramadevan, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that, to
qualify for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, the plaintiff must prove
affirmatively that the property has special features so that damages would be an inadequate
remedy. However, if, as Calnan suggests, the purchaser’s proprietary interest derives from
the agreement itself and not from the availability of specific performance, the purchaser
might still have a proprietary claim in the vendor’s bankruptcy even if the court were to deny
specific performance on discretionary grounds. For criticism of Semelhago, see Robert
Chambers, The Importance of Specific Performance, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 431,
434–48 (Simone Degeling & James Edelman eds., Sydney, Australia: Lawbook Co., 2005).
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balance between the pari passu principle and the property of the estate
principle. The difference is that, as in other contexts, English law relies on
formal distinctions to do the work, whereas the United States approach is
more openly policy-based and more nuanced.
VII. Conclusion
The status of proprietary remedies in bankruptcy is a difficult topic—
so difficult that, until not very long ago, it was hard even to discern the
reasons for the difficulty, let alone to prescribe a solution to the problem.
Thanks in substantial part to the Restatement in the United States, and to
the recent contributions of scholars in England and other parts of the
Commonwealth, we now do know the causes of the problem and we are
well on the way to resolving it. The source of the difficulty is that there are
at least three inter-related sets of considerations in play. The first is the
distinction between personal and proprietary claims. The second is the
interplay between two fundamental bankruptcy law principles: the pari
passu sharing principle and the property of the estate principle. And the
third is the tension between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy policy
objectives.
In common law systems, the distinction between personal and
proprietary remedies is blurred by the intervention of equity. Courts of
equity, under the rubric of the maxim, "equity deems as done what ought to
be done," invest certain personal claims with proprietary status, but the
reasons for doing so are rarely articulated with any clarity. In the case of
long-established equitable interests, such as the trust and the equity of
redemption, the logical infirmities which underpin them no longer matter,
given the antiquity of the supporting case law. These days, such interests
are accepted without question, supported simply by the weight of authority.
The same is not true, though, of more modern attempts to apply the maxim.
Claims for the recognition of new proprietary interests are bound to be
scrutinized on grounds of both logic and policy so that the underlying issues
are forced out into the open. To take the mistaken payment case as an
example, at least in England and other parts of the Commonwealth where
the case law is less settled than it is in the United States, the proprietary
status of the payer’s claim cannot be supported simply on the basis of the
equitable maxim. It must also be explained why the maxim should apply
and this, in turn, raises the other two sets of concerns identified above.
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The property of the estate principle and the pari passu sharing
principle are both part of all good bankruptcy law courses. But they are
typically taught as separate topics so that the inter-relationship between
them may not be immediately obvious. The property of the estate principle
is inconsistent with the pari passu sharing principle because it provides a
basis for giving certain unsecured creditors priority over others. By the
same token, the pari passu sharing principle is in tension with the property
of the estate principle because a too rigorous insistence on equal
distribution may defeat third party entitlements. The challenge for the
bankruptcy lawyer is to identify where the balance should be struck. The
answer cannot lie simply in an appeal to property rights as determined by
non-bankruptcy law because, in the cases under consideration, the property
rights are unsettled. Inevitably, therefore, the question resolves into a
policy one.
At the policy level, there are competing bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy considerations at work. The relevant bankruptcy considerations
are: (1) the requirement of equal treatment for creditors (pari passu); and
(2) the importance of maximizing the size of the bankruptcy estate for the
benefit of the creditors collectively. In the mistaken payment and
misrepresentation cases, the relevant non-bankruptcy objective is corrective
justice for restitution claimants, while in the fiduciary cases it is deterrence
of wrongdoing. The challenge for the judge and the lawmaker is to identify
these policy tensions and strike an appropriate trade-off. As the discussion
in this Article has shown, United States law, as represented in the
Restatement, though sharing many common elements with the law in
England and other parts of the Commonwealth, is also different in some
important respects. The existence of these differences should not really
come as a surprise because the questions in issue all turn ultimately on
policy trade-offs, and it is in the nature of a trade-off that reasonable minds
might differ over the point at which it should be struck.

